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In this paper we employ a two stage Cournot duopoly model where firms can obtain outside
funds only to finance production plans; payouts to shareholders are not allowed. Debt, equity
and capacity are chosen in the first stage and output is chosen in the second stage. In contrast
to the existing literature in this area, we show firms always choose zero debt in equilibrium.
The two important implications of our analysis are (a) while there are linkages between
financial structure and product market decisions, these linkages have no real effect on the
choice of optimal capital structure of a firm, and (b) the standard results in this area are not
robust to model specifications.
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Models of capital structure that use features of industrial organisation started appearing in
the literature over the past decade and a half. The literature has mainly evolved around the
pioneering paper of Brander and Lewis (1986). Abstracting from the well known determi-
nants of capital structure, these models show that ﬁrms with limited liability will choose a
positive amount of debt in equilibrium. Leverage makes a ﬁrm more aggressive in quantity
competition and this gives debt a strategic advantage.
In this paper we provide a modiﬁed framework of the interaction between the ﬁnancial
structure and output market decisions of ﬁrms with limited liability. In particular, we employ
a variant of the Brander and Lewis (1986) type Cournot duopoly model where debt, equity
and capacity are chosen in the ﬁrst stage and output is chosen in the second stage. In our
framework ﬁrms can only obtain outside ﬁnance to ﬁnance production plans; payouts to
shareholders are not allowed. In contrast to the existing literature in this area we show ﬁrms
will always choose zero debt in equilibrium. Two important implications of our analysis are
(a) while there are linkages between ﬁnancial structure and product market decisions, these
linkages have no real eﬀect on the choice of optimal capital structure of a ﬁrm, and (b) the
existing results are not robust in the sense that a slight modiﬁcation of the model changes
the results quite dramatically.
1.1 A Brief Literature Review
The modern theory of capital structure, as it stands today, began with the celebrated paper
of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Till the mid 1980s, the industrial organisation literature
assumed that in choosing its competitive strategy the ﬁrm’s objective is to maximise total
proﬁts. The ﬁnance literature, on the other hand, focussed on maximisation of equity value
while generally ignoring product market strategy. The linkages between ﬁnancial and output
market decisions were largely ignored until Brander and Lewis (1986).
Their pioneering paper considers a homogeneous product duopoly in which ﬁnancial and
output market decisions follow in a sequence. Brander and Lewis (1986) show that any ﬁrm,
with limited liability, competing in a Cournot framework with an exogenous demand shock
would always ﬁnd it optimal to become leveraged. The limited liability nature of debt forces
a ﬁrm to behave more aggressively in the product market. In recent years a number of papers
like Maksimovic (1988), Glazer (1994), Campos (1995), Showalter (1995) and Dastidar and
Sengupta (1998) have formalized the ways in which product market decisions may both
inﬂuence and be inﬂuenced by corporate ﬁnancing decisions. Most of these papers operate
within the framework of Brander and Lewis, 1986 (henceforth called B-L). However there
are a few inconsistencies in this framework. Some of them have been discussed in Dasgupta
and Titman (1996) and Faure-Grimaud (2000).
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a modiﬁed framework, derive certain results and
compare them with the existing results.
12 The Standard Story and its Problems
2.1 The standard story
Consider a homogeneous product duopoly where each ﬁrm is owned by a group of risk
neutral shareholders protected by limited liability, who may turn to outside investors to
ﬁnance production instead of only using equity capital. It is assumed that ﬁrms can raise
funds in a competitive capital market. In such a capital market a group of debtholders with
identical outside options is willing to supply ﬁrm i with a loan with face value Di, which is
payable once the product market proﬁts have been called in.
In stage 1 each ﬁrm chooses a level of debt in order to maximise its expected total market
value, where total value is equity value plus debt value. Debt is understood, in general, as
any kind of monetary obligation which the ﬁrm must pay back before dividends can be
distributed to shareholders. In the second stage the ﬁrms choose output levels taking as
given the debt levels chosen in the ﬁrst stage. Here it is assumed that the manager of the
ﬁrm is free to choose whatever output level he desires after debt is issued. In the second stage
output is chosen to maximise expected returns to the shareholders. The equilibrium concept
is sequentially rational Nash equilibrium in debt levels and output levels. In other words,
the second stage outcome is a Cournot equilibrium in output which is correctly anticipated
by ﬁrms when choosing debt levels in the ﬁrst stage. The output decisions of ﬁrms are made
before the realisation of a random variable reﬂecting variation in demand. Once proﬁts are
determined, ﬁrms are obliged to pay debt claims out of operating proﬁts, if possible. If
proﬁts are insuﬃcient to meet the debt obligations, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt and its assets
are turned over to the debtholders.
In this set up and under certain general assumptions B-L derives two basic results. (i) In
the ﬁnancial stage of the game, both ﬁrms will always select a positive level of debt because
it has a strategic eﬀect on rival’s output. (ii) The second result is precisely this strategic
eﬀect: as a consequence of the protection oﬀered to shareholders by limited liability, the
behaviour of a leveraged ﬁrm in the product market is more aggressive relative to that of an
unleveraged ﬁrm.
2.2 The Problems
The above story has a few weaknesses. The ﬁrst result, mentioned above, is not necessarily
true. Campos (1995) has shown with the help of an interesting counter-example that zero
debt can arise in equilibrium. Dastidar (1999) generalises the Campos counter-example and
provides the more correct version of the main B-L result.
More importantly, this framework has other problems. Firstly, nothing in the standard
model ensures that the debt taken do not exceed the ﬁnancing requirements. If in equilib-
rium, the debt taken exceeds the ﬁnancing requirements, one needs a convincing story of
how these extra funds are utilised. One such possible story is that, the shareholders of a
ﬁrm can decide to “leverage up” by having the ﬁrm issue debt and simply distribute the
money to the shareholders. Leveraged recapitalisations are observed sometimes in practice,
for example as anti- takeover measures, and the money that is obtained from (new) lenders
is not invested, but transferred to shareholders.
2Secondly, it is also not very clear how Di (the face value of debt) is determined. Note
that Di is the face value of debt which the ﬁrm promises to pay back out of operating proﬁts,
if possible. There is no mention of the amount of funds that a ﬁrm actually receives (the
market value of debt) from the debtholders, which are used to ﬁnance the capital investment1.
Two related contributions which also discuss some of the above mentioned problems of the
above framework are Dasgupta and Titman (1996) and Faure-Grimaud (2000). The paper
by Dasgupta and Titman (1996) extends Showalter (1995) criticisms to the static nature of
the B-L approach and shows that the analysis of the product market and ﬁnancial interaction
in oligopolies make more sense in dynamic settings. In fact, they also discuss the role of
initial capital requirements and the need of a ﬁxed investment and show how B-L results
may change. Faure-Grimaud (2000) also supports the need of distinguishing between market
v a l u ea n df a c ev a l u eo fd e b ta n dp o i n t so u tt h ef a i l u r eo ft h es t a n d a r df r a m e w o r ki nd o i n g
so. However, these papers are set in an optimal contract setting and the results are also very
diﬀerent from ours.
In view of the problems in the standard model we suggest the following framework.
3 The Modiﬁed Framework
Consider the following scenario in a symmetric cost, homogeneous product duopoly. Each
ﬁrm is owned by a group of risk neutral shareholders protected by limited liability. Firm
i has an initial equity capital of Ai.E a c h ﬁr mw a n t st os e tu pac a p a c i t yl e v e lKi.T h e
cost for setting up Ki level of capacity is cKi. If it is the case that cKi >A i then ﬁrm i
has to turn to outside sources for ﬁnancing the cost of capacity creation. Each ﬁrm has two
options. It can ﬁnance costs either through debt or through ﬂoating new equity or both.
In case of debt ﬁnance, a ﬁrm receives Dmi (the market value of debt) and promises to pay
back Di (the face value of debt) with limited liability. Floating new equity means that a part
of the ﬁrm is being sold (the new equity holders become part owners in proportion to their
share of equity capital to the total equity stock). Debt as before, is understood, in general,
as any kind of monetary obligation which the ﬁrm must pay back before dividends can be
distributed to shareholders. We assume that ﬁrms can only obtain outside funds to ﬁnance
production plans; payouts to shareholders are not allowed.
We consider the following two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage each ﬁrm chooses the level
of capacity to be set up and also the amount of debt and/or new equity (if required) to
ﬁnance such capacity build up. It is assumed that a ﬁrm can produce upto capacity at zero
cost. In the second stage the ﬁrms choose output levels subject to the capacity constraint
and compete in the Cournot way. In this stage output is chosen to maximise the return
to the shareholders. The output decisions of the ﬁrms are made before the realisation of
ar a n d o mv a r i a b l er e ﬂecting variation in demand. Once revenues are determined, ﬁrms are
obliged to pay debt claims out of revenue, if possible. If revenues are insuﬃcient to meet
1However, it should be mentioned here that equityholders in B-L do eﬀectively internalise the costs
that debtholders suﬀer from any risky actions they take in the product market because in their model
equityholders maximise the total ﬁrm value (debt value + equity value) in the ﬁrst stage. Thus any reduction
to debtholders returns is felt by equityholders, similar to a reduction in the market value of debt if they were
only maximisimising equity value.
3debt obligations, the ﬁrm goes bankrupt and its assets are turned over to the debtholders2.
The game is solved backwards; the ﬁrst stage equilibrium capacity, debt and/or equity levels
are determined using second-stage results. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms choose capacity, debt
and equity to maximise returns to the shareholders (i.e. the equity value) only. Recall
that in the standard model the ﬁrst stage objective function is maximisation of total value.
However, it may be noted, total value maximisation makes sense only in a B-L set-up where
the market value of debt is not included. Maximising total ﬁrm value is then needed so that
equityholders are forced to internalise any actions that reduce returns to debtholders.
Note that our framework clearly points out what is the ﬁnancing requirement and how the
ﬁnancing is being carried out. Financing requirements are determined by choice of capacity
and if the existing equity stocks are insuﬃcient to ﬁnance such costs then ﬁrms go for debt
and/or new equity. We also make clear, in case of debt ﬁnance, how much a ﬁrm receives
(it receives Dmi, t h em a r k e tv a l u e )a n dh o wm u c hi tp r o m i s e st op a yb a c k( i tp r o m i s e st o
pay back Di, the face value). In the model we explicitly discuss how (given risk neutrality
of debtholders) the face value of debt (Di) is determined. We will later see, a ﬁrm always
choose zero debt in equilibrium.
Here it may be mentioned that the existing ﬁnance literature on capital structure ex-
amines many factors inﬂuencing the choice of debt. The most standard treatment involves
trading oﬀ the tax advantages against the bankruptcy costs in determining the optimal
debt-equity mix. Also, some analysts have stressed the use of capital structure to signal in-
formation about the ﬁrm to investors. In this paper, we abstract from these well -understood
determinants of capital structure and focus on that motive of holding (or not holding) debt
which derives from the strategic aspects of leverage in relation to output markets.
We now provide the model of our exercise.
4 The Model
4.1 The set up
There are two symmetric limited liability ﬁrms in a homogeneous product market, each
owned by a set of risk neutral shareholders. Each ﬁrm has an initial equity capital Ai.I nt h e
ﬁrst stage both ﬁrms decide simultaneously on capacity levels, K1 and K2. In doing so they
incur costs of cK1 and cK2 respectively3. In this stage they also simultaneously choose debt
and/or equity which are used to ﬁnance the cost of capacity creation. Firm i takes debt of
market value Dmi ≥ 0 and promises to pay back the face value Di. It also raises new equity





[E{max(Revenue − Di,0)}] to the new
equity holders. Note that E[.] refers to the expected value. Also note that the new equity





of the ﬁrm. Hence they have to be paid back this fraction
of the total returns after the face value of debt (Di) has been paid. In the ﬁrst stage all
2Like B-L we assume that asset values are normalised to zero.
3In Industrial Organisation Theory there is huge literature on two stage games where capacity is chosen
in the ﬁrst stage. They stem out mostly from Spence(1977) and Dixit (1980). The game we consider is
qualitatively diﬀerent from this.
4choices are made subject to the constraint Dmi +Y i =m a x{cKi − Ai,0} 4. As noted before,
we assume that ﬁrms can only obtain outside funds to ﬁnance production plans; payouts to
shareholders are not allowed.
In the second stage each ﬁrm chooses production levels, qi ≤ Ki and compete in the
Cournot way to maximise the returns to the shareholders. For simplicity, it is assumed that
the ﬁrm can produce upto capacity at zero cost and it cannot produce beyond capacity. The
capacity is binding. Let r be the going competitive rate of interest and this represents the
identical outside option for everybody.
Let Ri(qi,qj,z) be the revenue accruing to the ith ﬁrm, where the random variable
z ∈ [z, z], which has the density function f(z) and distribution function F(z).T h i sr e ﬂects
the eﬀects of an uncertain environment on the fortunes of ﬁrm i.T h ev a l u eo fz is realised
only after actual sales take place. In other words, the ﬁrms choose quantities qi and qj and
then revenues are realised.
We assume that Ri satisﬁes the usual properties :
Ri
ii(.) < 0,R i
j(.) < 0 and Ri
ij(.) < 0 (subscripts denote partial derivatives. For example,
Ri
ij(.)= ∂2Ri
∂qi∂qj. ). We also assume that Ri
z > 0 and Ri
iz > 0. It means that higher realisations
of state z corresponds to higher revenue and higher marginal revenue. These assumptions
are similar to the standard model.
In the second stage the ﬁrms choose quantities subject to the ﬁrst stage capacity con-







i, 0}] where q
i ≤ K
i.
As before, in the above expression E[.] stands for the expected value. The above indicates
that after production and sales take place and the uncertainty regarding the ﬁrm’s revenue
is settled, the ﬁrm is obliged to pay creditors Di out of its current revenue. If the ﬁrm is
unable to meet its debt obligations, its creditors are paid whatever revenue is available and










In the above ˆ zi(qi,qj,D i) is the critical bankruptcy threshold of z such that ﬁrm i0s














4If ciKi ≤ Ai, then immediately it follows that Dmi
,Yi =0 . Debt and new equity are ﬂoated only if the
initial equity capital (Ai)i si n s u ﬃcient to ﬁnance desired capacity creation costs.
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4.2 Determination of the face value of debt
In the ﬁrst stage the debt holders have given ﬁrm i as u mo fDmi. Since they are risk neutral
they should set a Di such that they can expect to be paid back Dmi(1 + r).I f Di is the













j),z )f(z)dz + D
i(1 − F(ˆ z
i)) (4)
In the above qi∗(Ki) represents the equilibrium choice of output in the second stage. The
ﬁrst term in (4) represents the revenue of the ﬁrm in states of the world when this revenue
is insuﬃcient to completely cover debt obligations. The second term represents those states
of the world in which the creditors of the ﬁrm are paid in full. Now, since the debt holders
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Dmi(1 + r) −
R ˆ zi
z Ri(qi∗(Ki),q j∗(Kj),z )f(z)dz
1 − F(ˆ zi)
(5)




1 − F(ˆ zi)
(6)
While computing the above derivative we used equation (2) which is given by Ri(qi,qj,
ˆ zi)=Di.
65 The Main Results
5.1 Equilibrium in the second stage





































j,z)f(z)dz =0 ( 7 )
Given strict concavity of Ri, β(qj) will be single valued and continuous and so will be
λ(qj).
Clearly an equilibrium always exist and we denote it by qi∗(Ki) (where i =1 ,2). Note
that, like B-L we have
dqi∗
(Ki)
dDi > 0 for qi∗(Ki) <K i. Hence we come to our ﬁrst result which
is very similar to Proposition 1 of B-L.
Proposition 1 Given our assumptions, the second stage Nash equilibrium output levels
qi∗(Ki) a r ei n c r e a s i n gi nd e b tl e v e l sDi,p r o v i d e dqi∗(Ki) <K i. If qi∗(Ki)=Ki,t h e nt h e
equilibrium output levels do not change when Di increases.
Proof The proof follows immediately from Proposition 1 of Brander and Lewis (1986).¥
The above result shows that more leverage makes a ﬁrm more aggressive in output com-
petition in the second stage.
5.2 Subgame perfect equilibrium
As discussed before we take equity value maximisation to be our objective function in the
ﬁrst stage. The equilibrium concept is sequentially rational Nash equilibrium in debt, equity,
capacity (chosen in stage one) and output levels (chosen in stage two). In other words, the
second stage outcome is a Cournot equilibrium in output (subject to capacity constraints)
which is correctly anticipated by ﬁrms when choosing debt, equity and capacity levels in the
ﬁr s ts t a g e .N o t et h a ts i n c er is the going competitive rate of interest, it represents identical
outside option for everybody.











is the fraction of the ﬁrm owned by him and Hi is the total return to the
equityholders. Now he will invest Y i in the ﬁrm only if
Y i
Ai + Y iH
i ≥ Y
i(1 + r) ⇔ H
i − (1 + r)(Y
i + A
i) ≥ 0.
Also note that the total ﬁn a n c i n gr e q u i r e m e n t sh a v et ob em e t .T h a ti s ,w em u s th a v e
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where λ1,λ2 ≥ 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximisation are the following.
dL
dDmi = −(1 + r)(1 + λ1)+λ2 ≤ 0( 9 )
D
mi
(λ2 − (1 + λ1)(1 + r)) = 0 (9a)
dL
dY i = −λ1(1 + r)+λ2 ≤ 0( 1 0 )
8Y






















=0 ( 1 1 a)
Note that in a subgame perfect equilibrium qi∗(Ki)=Ki because any choice of Ki >
qi∗(Ki) does not increase payoﬀs. Hence,
dqi∗
(Ki)
dKi =1 . It may also be mentioned here that
while computing the above derivatives we used equations (2), (3a)-(3d) and (6). Now we
come to our main result.
Proposition 2 In the sequential game where debt, equity and capacity are chosen in the
ﬁrst stage and output is chosen in the second stage, the optimum debt taken will be zero
and the entire ﬁnancing will be done through equity only.
Proof From (10), we get that (−λ1(1+r)+λ2) ≤ 0. Using this in (9) we get that dL
dDmi < 0.
This implies (from 9a) that in equilibrium Dmi is zero.¥
Comment This result stands in contrast to the standard literature. In their paper B-L
show that ﬁrms always take positive debt in equilibrium. The reasons for the diﬀerence in
our result with the standard ones in the literature are as follows.
In the standard model, at the second stage, the manager of the ﬁrm is free to choose
whatever output level he desires after debt is issued. Also, the objective function in the ﬁrst
stage is maximisation of total value (Hi+Wi). Debt value (Wi) increases with Di. However,
Di aﬀects equity value (Hi) in two ways. As a direct eﬀect Hi decreases with Di. Indirectly,
however, Di has a positive eﬀect. As noted before (Proposition 1), debt (or leverage) creates
an incentive to increase output in the second stage. In Cournot oligopoly models, ﬁrms have
an incentive to commit to producing large outputs since this causes their rivals to produce
less. Leverage thus provides a device that allows ﬁrms to commit to producing more in the
Cournot oligopoly and this gives the positive strategic aﬀect of debt on equity value. In
this standard model the strategic indirect eﬀect of debt on Hi dominates the direct eﬀect of
debt on (Hi + Wi) for small levels of debt. As a result, both ﬁrms choose positive debt in
equilibrium.
On the other hand, in our model, capacity choice in the ﬁrst stage restricts output choice
in the second stage. Also the ﬁrst stage objective function is maximisation of equity value
only. In our model, the direct eﬀect of debt dominates the indirect strategic eﬀect for all
levels of debt. Though debt makes a ﬁrm more aggressive in quantity competition in the
9second stage, taking debt only serves to lower returns to the equity owners in the ﬁrst
stage. Therefore, in equilibrium we observe zero debt. As a result, the ﬁrms will be com-
pletely equity ﬁnanced.
It may be noted that our framework derives the results by considerably changing the
strategic situation. Essentially, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, output levels are chosen at
the ﬁrst stage (costly capacity choice), not at the second stage (costless production of output,
subject to capacity constraints). Simultaneously, the ﬁrms make their borrowing decisions
- this “kills” the risk shifting that drives the results in B-L and other related papers. In
these papers, the sequential decisions (ﬁrst borrowing, then output choice) mainly drive
their result. In our model, capacity expansion is costly, and beyond the Cournot level it has
no advantages, so the “limited liability eﬀect” vanishes here.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Models of capital structure, which evolve around Brander and Lewis (1986) and use features
of industrial organisation, fall in the class of exceptions to the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
Abstracting from the well known determinants of capital structure, these models show that
ﬁrms with limited liability choose a positive amount of debt in equilibrium. Leverage makes
a ﬁrm more aggressive in quantity competition and this gives debt a strategic advantage. In
this paper we argue that these models have certain problems and the results are not robust
to model speciﬁcations. In particular, we employ two stage Cournot duopoly model where
debt, equity and capacity are chosen in the ﬁrst stage and output is chosen in the second
stage. In our framework ﬁrms can only obtain outside ﬁnance to ﬁnance production plans;
payouts to shareholders are not allowed. In contrast to the existing literature in this area,
we show ﬁrms always choose zero debt in equilibrium. The basic point is, while there are
important linkages between ﬁnancial structure and product market decisions, these linkages
have no real eﬀect on the choice of optimal capital structure of a ﬁrm.
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